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Abstract
Optimal labor tax results over the cycle are, quantitatively, typically driven by an estimate of the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution that governs the reaction of hours worked to business cycle
shocks and tax rate changes. A recent literature tries to decompose this intratemporal elasticity into its
main components, the ”Ins and Outs of Unemployment” (Shimer (2007)) to emphasize the importance
of the extensive margin. This paper provides a model that a.) endogenizes all transition rates including
firings and quits on the job as well as movements in and out of inactivity, b.) explains the fluctuations
in these rates quantitatively while allowing for differences across gender and c.) remains tractable and
open to Ramsey-optimal policy.
We estimate the model on US-data for the years 1970:1 to 2004:4 and show that the model predicts
all labor market flows very well. We apply our model to show that observed labor tax rates over the
cycle correspond fairly closely to the implied Ramsey-optimal ones.
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1 Introduction
Optimal labor tax results over the cycle are, quantitatively, typically driven by an estimate of the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution that governs the reaction of hours worked to business cycle
shocks and tax rate changes. A recent literature has emerged that has emphasized the important role
of the extensive margin, in particular the high volatility of unemployment rates, for business cycle
dynamics. The focus has shifted away from the neoclassical labor-leisure trade-off to a decomposition
of the ”Ins and Outs of Unemployment”, see Shimer (2007). These labor market transitions decompose
the standard hour’s worked choice of the neoclassical model into its components and can potentially
provide us with a better understanding of labor market reactions to business cycle shocks. To date
much attention has been paid to the job-finding probability given that the results in Shimer (2007)
suggest that this probability is the main driving force for (un)-employment fluctuations, explaining
about 50% of the unemployment volatility. However, his findings do not necessarily imply that labor
force participation rates or firing rates are unimportant. This is particularly true for issues concerning
optimal fiscal policy over the cycle given that his results, at face value, describe the percentage share
of actual employment rate behavior under a given policy. Without a structural model not much can
be learned about the importance of different flows under alternative policies.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide a structural general equilibrium model with an
extensive and an intensive margin that a.) endogenizes all transition rates including firings and quits
on the job as well as movements in and out of inactivity, b.) explains the fluctuations in these rates
quantitatively and c.) remains tractable and open to Ramsey-optimal policy.
To this end we proceed in 4 steps:
First, we utilize a discrete choice framework that allows us to deal in a straightforward manner with
the particular truncations that typically complicate endogenous entry/destruction models. Under
particular distributional assumptions this choice structure allows us to obtain closed form solution
for the truncation points which in turn allows us to introduce endogenous choice probabilities while
essentially keeping the representative agent structure of the model. The model remains continuously
differentiable and open to Ramsey optimal policy using standard tools.
Second, our model explicitly allows for the different labor market behavior across gender. This might
be important, quantitatively, when discussing the distortive element of labor taxes given that females
comprise a much bigger inactive group than males. Most studies on the intratemporal substitution
elasticity also suggest that females have a significantly higher intratemporal elasticity than males, see
Alesina and Ichino (2007). These gender differences can be important for optimal tax rate policy given
that females are likely to react stronger to tax-incentives over the cycle than their male counterparts.
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We highlight in the companion paper, see Jung (2008), that even with the same preference parameters
for the labor-leisure choice in our model the implied intratemporal elasticity of substitution (or a
corresponding concept adapted to the participation decision) for females will be higher than for males
due to technological and distributional differences.
In a third step, we use observed measures for taxes, governmental expenditures and a TFP-measure
as exogenous driving forces to compare the predictions of the model to the data for the years 1970:1
to 2004:4. Using the estimated exogenous shock processes as inputs we show that the model pre-
dicts all transition flows and other labor market variables fairly well. In particular we are able to
show that firing/separation rates and the job-finding probability, which we both predict almost per-
fectly, are driven by the same common factor, the profit of the firm, as suggested already by the
standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework and elaborated in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000).
Our prediction of the time-series path of quits allows us to provide a structural interpretation on
the importance of firing rates and job-finding probabilities, that has been debated between Shimer
(2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2007). Given that both rates are driven by the identical force, the
data-driven counterfactuals suggested in Shimer (2007) and Fujita and Ramey (2007) loose part of
their controversy.
The quantitative impact of labor taxes suggests that the government can, potentially, use its influence
on this margin to smooth out cyclical variation in employment to stabilize the business cycle. We
apply our model, in a final step, to the Ramsey problem of optimal labor tax rates over the cycle, which
is typically infeasible in endogenous destruction or entry models that rely on a numerical evaluation
of the cut-off level. We use this tool to ask the counterfactual question how the labor market had
looked like if the US-policy had followed a Ramsey optimal path. We show that the government
by encouraging or discouraging workers to actively search for a job, mainly influence the behavior
of females by adjusting labor tax rates over the cycle. However, our analysis suggests that it is not
optimal to follow a very aggressive stabilization policy given that there are substantial switching cost
involved that need to be internalized.
Our paper fits into the tradition of the neoclassical Ramsey-taxation literature. The optimal tax policy
has been extensively studied, see i.e. Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999)1. Benigno and Woodford
(2006b) and Benigno and Woodford (2006a) provide a time-consistent solution method to the basic
stochastic neoclassical Ramsey-optimal policy model by restricting the choice set at period zero in a
particular way. Their results can be viewed as a benchmark case which with to compare labor market
matching models. As shown in the companion paper, models with labor market frictions substantially
1see Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a survey of optimal taxation in the neoclassical model, and Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986) as the classical references.
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deviate from the neoclassical world given that labor taxes add an additional intertemporal distortion to
the model that is absent in the neoclassical world. Therefore, in the absence of additional instruments,
capital tax rates will, in general, be positive.
The extension to labor force participation within the Mortensen-Pissarides framework has been ana-
lyzed in Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005) for average transition rates and in Haefke and Reiter (2006)
for cyclical variations. We extend part of their insights to a considerably richer general equilibrium
framework in which we can conduct Ramsey-optimal policy. Quantitatively our model relies on the
ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides framework in explaining the ”Ins and Outs” of unemployment,
see Shimer (2007). Our model builds upon the literature that tries to explain the puzzle observed
in Shimer (2005) and on the resolutions that have been proposed in, among many others, Hall and
Milgrom (2007), Costain and Reiter (2005a),Shimer (2005), Jung (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2006). Our mechanisms utilizes a sticky wage mechanisms similar to Hall and Milgrom (2007) that
allows us to resolve the Shimer-puzzle without resorting to the particular small surplus calibration of
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) which would be particularly troublesome in models that discusses tax
rate changes.
To our knowledge this paper is the first that provides a structural framework in which all transition
flows are addressed and estimated jointly.2
The paper proceeds as follows: In section I we presents the main model and derive some non-standard
feature due to the discrete choice structure of the model. Section II explains our calibration strategy
and shows how the model performance. Section III presents our results on optimal taxation. Section
IV concludes.
2 Description of the Model
Before giving the precise mathematical structure of the model we shall shortly outline the new elements
we wish to stress in this paper with respect to labor market decisions.
Time is discrete. There is a measure one of male and female workers in society. Males and females
face identical decision processes and have identical functional forms (but might differ in parameters).
Figure (1) plots the decision tree of the model with respect to the elements of the labor market. A
typical worker can be in three states, employed, unemployed or out of the labor force, denoted by
e˜ ∈ [e, u, o], respectively. Let gender g˜ ∈ [m, f ] denote male and female.
2We build upon the data provided by Shimer (2007) and Fallick and Fleischman (2004) and the discussion of the
properties in, among others, Fujita and Ramey (2007).
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Figure 1: Timeline of Events
Employment
Unemployment
Not in Labor Force
Quit/Not Quit
(Quit-Cost)
Fire/Not Fire
(Firing Cost)
Quit  to N
Quit to N
Matching Market
(Search Cost)
Decide to Search
(Set-up Cost)
Work
(Wage/Hour)
Work At Home
(Hours, Hometechnology)
UI-Benefits
Work At Home
(Hours,Hometechnology)
When employed the worker bargains with her employer, at the beginning of the period, about her wage
and hours worked and produces a labor good according to her linear (in hours worked) production
technology. At the end of the period she might move to a new employment state or remains in her
current job-relation. If she receives a favorable alternative offer, she might move to a new firm with
probability qt,g˜ . If she does not break up voluntarily, the firm might decide to fire her and does so with
probability ft,g˜ . If she has not been fired or has voluntarily quitted the job she might decide to drop
out of the labor force and stay at home next period. She does so with probability qt,eo,g˜. We employ a
hierarchical decision process to avoid tie-breaking assumptions that might occur if workers would like
to quit and be fired at the same instance. This also allows us to work with a decision process over
two alternatives only. However, our results are not sensitive to the ordering and can be generalized to
a higher stage decision process.3
When unemployed, the worker might work at home and potentially receives unemployment benefits.
She can either decide to stop searching for a job and drop out of the labor force with probability qt,uo,g˜
or pay a search cost and enter the matching market. If she is lucky, she is matched with a firm and
starts producing next period, otherwise she remains unemployed. Correspondingly, when out of the
3We also do not consider a joint bargaining process over firing and quitting decisions. Instead we assume a unilateral
process, given that we believe that private information would make a joint bargaining infeasible. However, it is straight-
forward to extend the equations to a decision process where workers and firms make their decisions jointly efficient.
The resulting choice probabilities would be functions of the total match surplus instead of the share that accrues to the
worker or the firm. Given the high correlation, our assumption will likely not affect the results significantly.
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labor force, she again might spend time working at home. She can decide to enter the search pool
after paying a setup cost with probability qt,ou,g˜ and enters the unemployment pool next period.
Discrete Choice Setup: Whenever the worker has a (discrete) choice she obtains an i.i.d. shock ǫ =
ǫ2 − ǫ1 reflecting the utility difference between the two choice states, say employed (ǫ2) and inactivity
(ǫ1). We assume that ǫ1 and ǫ2 are i.i.d. double exponentially distributed with zero mean, such that ǫ
is logistic distributed with zero mean and variance ψ
2π2
3 . At the beginning of the period, before these
shocks are materialized the worker decides on the cut-off level ǫ. Whenever the shock realizes above
this level, she decides to switch from inactivity to employment receiving ǫ2, while she remains inactive
otherwise and obtains a utility of ǫ1. Note that for welfare considerations just the utility difference
between the two alternatives matters.
To see this point more clearly, consider the following, for the moment ad hoc4, value functions of a
risk neutral worker, where the worker has a choice from moving to employment to earn a net wage
w(1 − τ l) with associated value Ve or to remain inactive and to earn an outside option value Aw
assumed proportional to wages with associated value Vo:
Ve = w(1− τ l) + β(1− λ)V
′
e + βλV
′
o
Vo = Aw + Emax{βV
′
e + ǫ1, βV
′
o + ǫ2}
From standard computations of an expected value of a maximum of extreme-value distribution we
know that optimal choices are given by:
πoe =
1
(1 + e
β(V ′o−V
′
e)
ψ )
and the value can be expressed as:
Vo = Aw + ψ log(e
βV ′e
ψ + e
βV o′
ψ )
as shown in Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992). Alternatively, we can rewrite the above program
4It turns out that these value functions capture the essence of the friction we wish to stress in this paper by noticing
that the worker receives a net wage when working while he receive a gross wage when inactive due to the assumption
that the government cannot tax home production. This wedge is important for the government when choosing tax rates
optimally.
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as choosing the cut-off value ǫ:
Ve = w(1− τ l) + β(1− λ)V
′
e + βλV
′
o
Vo = max
ǫ
Aw + π˜oeβ(V
′
e + E(ǫ1|e)) + (1− π˜oe)β(V
′
o + E(ǫ2|o))
= max
ǫ
Aw + E∗ǫ+ π˜oeβV
′
e + (1− π˜oe)βV
′
o
E∗ǫ = −[ψ(1− πoe) ln(1− πoe) + ψπoe ln(πoe))] > 0
π˜oe ≡
1
1 + e
− ǫ
ψ
ǫ = β(V ′e − V
′
o)
First order conditions of the alternative program immediately reveal the equivalence of the solution.5
The truncated expectation E∗ǫ and, by the law of large numbers, its average realization, is concave in
πoe given that
∂E∗ε˜
∂πoe
= ψ log(1−πoe
πoe
) and ∂E
∗ε˜
∂πoeπoe
< 0. This means that even though the idiosyncratic
shocks have a zero mean by assumption, the fact that the workers have a choice between the two
alternatives will lead to a positive valuation due to the truncation. The option value of this choice
depends on the variance ψ. The new program is continuously differentiable and can be handled much
5To see this more easily, note that πoe ≡ F˜ (ǫ) ≡ Pr(ǫ2 − ǫ1 ≤ ǫ) =
1
1+e
(
−ǫ
ψ
)
by the definition of a logistic random
variable, where ǫ1 and ǫ2 are extreme valued i.i.d. random variables with zero mean. We denote the distribution function
of the extreme-value distributed variables ǫi by Fi(x) and the corresponding density by fi(x). So, given a cut-off level ǫ
the expected value of the shock is given by:
Eǫ1 =
∞∫
−∞
xf1(x)F2(x+ ǫ)dx
F2(x+ ǫ) = e
−e
−
x+ǫ−η
ψ
f1(x) =
1
ψ
ke
(− x
ψ
)
e
−ke
−
x
ψ
k = e
η
ψ (1)
Following Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992), a change of variable gives :
Eǫ1 = −
∞∫
0
ψ log(t)e−t(1+e
−ǫ) −
∞∫
0
ψ log(k)e−t(1+e
−ǫ) (2)
Using:
∞∫
0
e
−st log(t)dt =
− log(s)− γ
s
; γ = Euler constant
s = (1 + e−ǫ) (3)
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easier than the original problem, given that we can let the family choose, by monotonicity and the law
of large numbers, the probabilities directly. In the sequel, we shall rely on this equivalence extensively.
To see how these choice probabilities map into elasticities define
∂πoe,t
∂wt+1
πoe,t
wt+1
= (1− πoe,t)β
(1− τ l −A)wt+1
ψ
Two main factors6 will govern this elasticity: The first factor is the underlying heterogeneity in
idiosyncratic preferences. The higher the underlying variance of the idiosyncratic utility distribu-
tion or say the search cost is, the smaller will be the impact of changes (and the smaller will be the
distortion on capital taxes). Intuitively ψ governs the mass of workers around the cut-off level and is
therefore an ultimate driving force for the reaction of the probabilities to business cycle shocks (who
implicitly change net wages) as well as for the reaction to tax rate changes. We identify this margin
by the volatility of the corresponding transition rates driven by aggregate shocks. The second crucial
margins, driven by technology, is given by the efficiency distance between home-production and the
market good A and the associated tax distortion. We will, once we have specified a general equilib-
rium version with endogenous hours choice, identify this margin by using the hour choice differentials
across gender and employment status using the time-use survey of Aguiar and Hurst (2007), given
that standard intratemporal hours worked decision across states will be a monotone function of the
differences in technology.
We obtain using the zero mean assumption:
Eǫ1 = ψ
log(1 + e−ǫ) + γ
(1 + e−ǫ)
+
η
(1 + e−ǫ)
= ψ
log(1 + e−ǫ)
(1 + e−ǫ)
e
−ǫ =
1− πoe
πoe
Eǫ1 = −ψπoe log(πoe)
Eǫ2 = −ψ(1− πoe) log(1− πoe) (4)
where the last step follows from the fact that the worker does not switch if ǫ1 − ǫ2 ≤ −ǫ and a symmetric argument.
So by properties of conditional expectations, Eǫ1 = πoeE(ǫ1|ǫ) and we can define the option value of having a choice as
Eǫ1 + Eǫ2 = E
∗ǫ, which gives the entropy type expectation:
E
∗
ǫ = −[ψ(1− πoe) ln(1− πoe) + ψπoe ln(πoe))] > 0 (5)
6In fact, in the fully developed general equilibrium version of the model the elasticity will also depend importantly
on preferences, i.e. the general equilibrium valuation of the home-produced good A and the market produced substitue.
To clarify the effect, our example abstracts from this dimension right now.
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We now embed this labor market structure into a general equilibrium model to discuss optimal taxation
in a meaningful way. To keep the model tractable we employ the standard family structure that pools
idiosyncratic uncertainty and assumes that unemployment risk is insured by the typical family. This
assumption allows us to stay within a representative agent framework and discuss Ramsey optimal
policy.
2.1 Firms
We introduce 4 different sectors into the economy. This structure is needed to endogenize home-
production, given that the decision to enter the labor market is a crucial ingredient of our model. As
shown in a companion paper, see Jung (2008) the interaction of the tax system with this margin is
quantitatively important.
The first three sectors are perfectly competitive and are used to ease aggregation. The final good
sector combines capital and a labor input good to produce the numeraire output good. This good Y1
is used for investment and for government spending:
Y1,t = e
atKαt L
1−α
1,t (6)
where Kt is aggregate capital, L1 is the amount of the labor good demanded in final production and
at is a technology shock assumed to follow and AR(1) process with normal increments.
The service good Y2,t is also produced competitively and is labor intensive, relative to the final good
sector:
Y2,t = L2,t (7)
We view this as a close substitute to home-produced goods. L2,t is the demand for the labor good
produced in the service sector.
The third sector, again perfectly competitive, simply aggregates the labor good, produced in the main
labor firm industry sector.
Lt = et,mlt,e,m + etf lt,e,f (8)
Let gender g˜ ∈ [m, f ] denote male and female respectively and denote the three labor market states
e˜ ∈ [e, u, o] as employment, unemployment and out of the labor force, respectively . Then mg˜ are the
measures of males and females in the society, et,g˜ are the percentage of employed males and females
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and lt,g˜ is the labor good produced in the labor service industry, where each employment relationship
is viewed as a particular match between one worker and one firm.
The technology when employed or working at home is given by the homogenous production function:
lt,e˜,g˜ = Ae˜,g˜ht,e˜,g˜ (9)
where ht,e˜,g˜ denotes the amount of hours supplied by males and females and Ae˜,g˜ denotes the technology
level of a typical males or female in each of the three labor market states. We allow this level to differ
across sex and employment state.
Aggregate prices from the final goods perfect competitive firms behavior are given by the standard
conditions:
rt, = α
Y1,t
Kt
(10)
pt,w = (1− α)
Y1,t
L1,t
(11)
where r denotes the interest rate and pw denotes the price of the labor good. Given perfect competition
pw is also the price charged by the service firms.
Market clearing requires that:
Lt = L1,t + L2,t (12)
2.2 Laws of motion:
The state variables of the economy are, for each gender, the measure of unemployed ug˜ and employed
workers eg˜, as well as the aggregate capital stock K and the exogenous shock processes described
below. Let δ denote the depreciation rate and I denote aggregate investment, then the respective laws
of motion are given by:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It (13)
et+1,g˜ = (1− qt,g˜)(1 − ft,g˜)(1 − qt,eo,g˜)et,g˜ + qt,g˜et,g˜ + (1− qt,ou,g˜)πt,ue,g˜ut,g˜ (14)
ut+1,g˜ = ut,g˜ (1− (1− qt,ou,g˜)πt,ue,g˜ − qt,uo,g˜) + et,g˜ ((1 − qt,g˜)ft,g˜) + ot,g˜πt,ou,g˜ (15)
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and
ot+1,g˜ = ot,g˜(1− πt,ou,g˜) + et,g˜ (1− qt,g˜)(1 − ft,g˜)qt,eo,f + qt,uo,g˜ut,g˜
where the inactivity state is redundant given that we have the accounting identity ot,g˜ = 1−ut,g˜ −et,g˜ .
Some remarks about the setup are in order: First, note that we do not allow direct flows from
inactivity to employment. By definition of unemployment as a state of search any flow from inactivity
to employment must go through the unemployment state, even for a short time interval. Our model
treats this decision process as lasting at least a month. When mapping the model to the data, a time-
aggregation bias as highlighted in Shimer (2007) arises. Second, our timing convention is, obviously,
somewhat arbitrary. We have chosen a sequential structure to ease the already quite complex structure,
and to avoid tie-breaking situations where a worker has to decide to quit to a new job or become
inactive. The sequential structure insures that the choice problem is binary, and therefore easier to
handle. 7
2.3 Family
To avoid complications with respect to the wage bargaining that arises in incomplete market setting
of the model, we assume the existence of a continuum of identical families that fully insures the con-
sumption risk of their individual members and decides on aggregate savings. Given the separability of
the preferences this implies that all individuals consume the same.8 In turn, however, the individual
gives up his bargaining rights, or, alternatively, evaluates the stream of utility flows from the perspec-
tive of the aggregate family. This assumption, basically, ensures a common discount kernel, implying
a common valuation of future streams of utility and allows us to neglect the distribution of capital
holdings as an additional (infinite dimensional) state variable.9
7We have experimented by flipping part of the decision processes, but the particularities of the choices are not driving
our results. Note that all workers are, conditional on their states, identical, and switching probabilities are quite small.
So the mass of workers that stochastically first decide not to quit, and are fired afterwards, or are first not fired and then
decide to quite, is almost identical. Even though the decision process is influenced by the aggregate shock, this influence
is typically small quantitatively.
8see Jung (2005) for a treatment of non-separable utility in a labor market context
9The main complication that would arise otherwise is not so much the handling of a measure over capital holdings,
given that standard tools could be used, but the fact that the wage bargaining would induce individual wages to a be a
function of individual capital holding. This fact would considerably complicates the numerical analysis, or would need
to be complemented by assumptions how average wages are set.. Also optimal policy would even be harder to do, see
Costain and Reiter (2005b) for an attempt, that does not deliver Ramsey optimal rules. These authors run precisely
into the problem that labor tax rates influence, in a first order sense, the bargaining surplus of the average worker which
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The representative family aggregates individual consumption and maximizes, given the law of mo-
tion of the state variables, sequences for wages and hours (derived below) and its budget constraint,
consumption allocations and transition probabilities according to the inter-temporal utility function:
U ≡ max
{c1,c2,c3,I,qg˜,fg˜,πou,g˜,πuo,g˜,qeo,g˜,ho,g˜ ,hu,g˜}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=t0
Eβt−t0 [2u(c(c1, c2, c3)
−
∑
g˜
et˜,gϕh
̺
t,e,g˜
− ut,g˜ϕh
̺
t,u,g˜
− ot,g˜ϕh
̺
t,o,g˜
+discrete choices] (16)
s.t.
Budget Constraint
Initial Conditions and Laws of Motion for states
Given sequences of wg˜, he,g˜ (17)
Here u(c(c1, c2, c3) is a consumption aggregator over the final good c1, the service good c2 and the
home-produced good c3.
u(c(c1, c2, c3) = log(c(c1, c2, c3)
with c being a consumption aggregator
c = (γc
γ1
1 + (1− γ)(c
γ2
2 + c
γ2
3 )
γ1
γ2 )
1
γ1 (18)
The parameters γ1, γ2 govern the substitution elasticity across goods and γ gives the share of the final
good relative to the labor intensive service good.
Here ht,e˜,g˜ is the amount of hours supplied by a worker, with gender-status g˜ and employment status
e˜. Note that workers who are not employed, still work in the sense of using time in producing at
home. ϕg˜ is a normalizing constant scaling hours worked and
1
̺−1 is the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution.
The term discrete choices is a short hand for the mean cost and the option value of having a (discrete)
is a function of aggregate capital holding in their model. This in turn delivers their strong results of tax rates on the
unemployment rate, which appears to be an artifact of their wage bargaining modeling.
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choice to change their respective labor states at the end of this period.
discrete choices =
∑
g˜
−eg˜{qt,g˜ϕg˜sq,g˜
̺ + ϕg˜seo,g˜
̺(1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)qt,eo,g˜
−E∗εt,ee,g˜ − (1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)E
∗εt,eo,g˜}
−ut,g˜(ϕg˜s
̺
uo,g˜
(1− πuo,g˜)− E
∗εt,uo,g˜)
−ot,g˜(πt,ou,g˜ϕg˜s
̺
ou,g˜
− E∗εt,ou,g˜) (19)
We express the fixed cost s associated with each choice in units of average hours worked. So, for
example, the utility cost of quitting an employment relation and moving to a new employer, potentially
in a different town, say, are denoted by sq,g˜ and are suppose to capture the potentially important cost
of moving, finding new friends and colleagues or being away from home. The notation for all other
cost are correspondingly. For example, the cost sou,g˜ captures the setup cost of staring to search for
a job.
The budget constraint of the family is given by:
(mm +mf )c1,t + (mm +mf )pw,tc2,t = mmwt,mht,met,m(1− τ t,l) +mmbt,mut,m
+mmet,mqt,m Edt+1Πm,t+1
+mfwt,fht,fet,f (1− τ l) +mfbt,fut,f
+mfet,fqt,f Edt+1Πf,t+1
+Kt + (rt, − δ)(1 − τ t,c)Kt −Kt+1 +Dt + Trt (20)
(mm +mf )c3,t = mfAt,u,fht,u,fut,f +mmAt,u,mht,u,mut,m
+mfAt,o,fht,o,fot,f +mmAt,o,mht,o,mot,m (21)
Here (r − δ)(1 − τ c) is the after-depreciation, after tax capital income, D are aggregate profits that
might arise in the economy and are distributed back to the owners, Tr denotes lump sum transfers or
taxes from or to the government and τ c, τ l denotes the capital and labor tax while K is the aggregate
capital stock. Unemployment benefits are denoted by bm for males and bf a for females, which we
allow to be different from their male counterpart in general. The unemployment rates and out of the
labor force rates are taken with respect to the mass of males and females, not with respect to total
population.
Having endogenous firing rates in the model, we decided to endogenize quits on the job as well to
capture the observed empirical regularity taken for example from the JOLST database, that overall
destruction rates are rather acyclical, while firing rates are countercyclical and quantitatively smaller
than overall destruction rates. Procyclical quits, as documented in Shimer (2007) basically dampens
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fluctuations in the overall destruction rate and capture the important transitions from employment to
employment, with a potentially one month intervening spell of inactivity as documented in Nagypal
(2005). Given that we did not want to increase the already quite complex structure of the model
by introducing separate matching functions for quits on the job10 we model the incentives to quit as
receiving an initial ”golden hand check” Edt+1Πt+1 when she decides to switch her job. To mimic the
behavior of on-the-job matching markets we assume that, on the job, workers can search and contact
other firms much more easily than unemployed workers.11 This implies that an infinite number of
firms stand ready to hire these workers without having to pay vacancy posting cost. We therefore
have to redistribute the profits that arise. We assume that these profits are paid lump sum up front to
the newly hired worker and that the standard bargaining starts from that point on, insuring that the
wage each worker receives is the same and that firms hiring workers on the job make zero profits.12
The amount of this extra payment is the probability adjusted saved amount of vacancy posting cost
the firm would incur when hiring an unemployed worker, or the value of a match from the firms
perspective, so our assumptions insures that firms still make zero profits on average.
The first order conditions for the different consumption and capital choices are:
∂u
∂c1,t
= λ1,t (22)
∂u
∂c2,t
= λ1,tpw,t (23)
∂u
∂c3,t
= λ2,t (24)
λ1,t = Eβλ1,t+1(1 + (rt+1 − δ)(1 − τ c,t+1)) (25)
β
λ1,t+1
λ1,t
≡ dt+1 (26)
where λ1,t is the lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, λ2,t is the lagrange multiplier on the
home-produced good constraint, and dt+1 is the definition of the discount kernel. Finally, the first
order conditions on the hours choice when working at home is given by:
At,u,g˜λ2,t = ϕ̺h
̺−1
t,u,g˜
(27)
At,o,g˜λ2,t = ϕ̺h
̺−1
t,o,g˜
(28)
The hour choice when employed is derived within the bargaining setup explained next.
10In fact it is straightforward to do and would also lead to pro-cyclical quitting behavior.
11That is they might have access to the companies intra-net and can switch jobs within their own company or have
contact to different companies through their job.
12This assumption allows us to remain within a representative agent framework. We assume that wages are continuously
re-bargained, and that all payments made before are sunk. This exclude the possibility of providing an optimal contract
over time and shifts the extra surplus as a lump-sum payment to the beginning of the job.
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2.4 Flow values and Bargaining
We now turn to a discussion of the matching markets, where the main labor friction is located. We
first derive the standard flow values of individual matches from the worker/family point of view and
then from the firms point of view. These values are needed to derive the bargaining solution in the
next section.
2.4.1 Flow Values
Given our assumption of perfect insurance the family values the stream of labor income at the
beginning of the period (that is before individual utility draws are made, but after the aggregate
shock is observed) from an employed or unemployed female is given as the marginal utility of having
one worker employed rather than unemployed. Define the lagrange multipliers on the law of motion
of the employment state variables e and u respectively as ∆t,eo,g˜ and ∆t,uo,g˜, and take first order
conditions with respect to next period employment states, we obtain13:
∆t,eu,g˜ = Vt,e,g˜ − Vt,u,g˜
∆t,eo,g˜ = Vt,e,g˜ − Vt,o,g˜ (29)
∆t,uo,g˜ = Vt,u,g˜ − Vt,o,g˜ (30)
Ve,g˜ = λ1,twt,g˜ht,g˜ (1− τ t,l)− ϕg˜h
̺
t,g˜
− ϕ
g˜
sq,g˜
̺qt,g˜ − (1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)qt,eo,g˜ϕfs
̺
eo,g˜
+ E∗ε˜t,ee,g˜
+λ1,tmg˜et,g˜qt,g˜ Edt+1Πg˜,t+1
+Eβ(1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)(1 − qt,eo,g˜)Vt+1,e,g˜
+Eβqt,g˜Vt+1,e,g˜ + Eβ(1− qt,g˜)ft,g˜Vt+1,u,g˜
+Eβ(1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)qt,eo,g˜Vt+1,o,g˜ + ((1− qt,g˜)(1− ft,g˜)E
∗ε˜t,eo,g˜
Vt,u,f = λ1,tbt,g˜ + λ2,tpt,wAt,u,g˜ht,u,g˜ − ϕg˜s
̺
uo,g˜
(1− πuo,g˜)− ϕg˜h
̺
t,u,g˜
+E∗ε˜t,uo,f
+Eβ(1− qt,uo,g˜)πt,ue,g˜Vt+1,e,g˜ + Eβ(1− qt,uo,g˜)(1− πt,ue,g˜)Vt+1,u,g˜ + qt,uo,g˜EβVt+1,o,g˜
Vt,o,f = λ2,tAt,o,g˜ht,o,g˜ − ϕg˜h
̺
t,o,g˜
− πt,ou,fϕfs
̺
o,g˜
+ E∗ε˜t,ou,g˜ + πt,ou,g˜EβVt,u,g˜ + (1− πt,ou,g˜)EβVt+1,o,g˜
To reiterate, the expectation (emphasized with E∗) with respect to the idiosyncratic utility components
is a particular truncated value, and is derived below. Note that all wage terms are deflated by the
13Again, say ∆t,eu,g˜ is redundant. One can, after some algebra, rewrite the system below, as is done in our coding,
in terms of, say, ∆t,uo,g˜ and ∆t,eo,g˜ alone, replacing all Vx terms. However, the decomposition below is much easier to
interpret because they relate back to the flow value function equations of a standard labor market model.
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lagrange multipliers (which one can think of as 1
c
). This essentially converts utility flows to the same
units as valuations of goods and services.
Turning to individual matches from the firms perspective, firms profit values are given by:
Πt,g˜ = pt,wAt,g˜ht,g˜ − wt,g˜ht,g˜ + Edt+1(1− ft,g˜)(1− qt,g˜)(1 − qt,eo,g˜)Πt+1,g˜
−(1− qt,g˜)fF,g˜κF,g˜ + (1− qt,g˜)E
∗ε˜t,Π,g˜ (31)
Here κF,g˜ denote firing costs and the idiosyncratic shock is interpreted as a random fixed cost, say
energy cost, that has to be paid if the match is prolonged to the next period and is denominated in
units of the final output good. We account for it in the aggregate resource constraint.14
2.5 Bargaining and Wage Setting
It remains to specify how wages and hours are set in this economy. A standard approach would look
at the Nash-bargaining over the surplus from employment to unemployment, and is given by:
(Ve,f − Vu,f )
µ(Πf )
1−µ
Standard first order condition would be given by:
λ1,tµ(1− τ l,t)
(Vt,e,f − Vt,u,f )
=
1− µ
Πf,t
As argued in the introduction, for optimal taxation the form of the wage setting is crucial. In particular,
in our model the Nash-bargaining rule would have a first order effect on the profit-share of firms, which
in turn would strongly influence unemployment volatility over the cycle. Additionally, the resolution
of the Shimer-puzzle within this wage setting mechanism leads to a very small match surplus and
potentially counterfactual reactions to changes in unemployment benefits, as argued in Costain and
Reiter (2005a).
To provide a benchmark where these effect do not occur, we follow ideas from Hall and Milgrom (2007)
who argue that the threat point of the worker is essentially independent of unemployment benefits. In
accordance with this view, we assume that the threat point of the worker is not unemployment, but
delay or strike. That is if bargaining breaks down, the worker strikes for a month and next period
will restart his bargaining. So his outside option is given by the amount of strike money she receives
from her family or union supporting her strike, or the gains she has from delaying:
She might still decide to quit during the month if she receives an alternative offer and might still
be fired at the end of the month (even though we need to assume here that this decision would be
14At chosen parameter values, the overall fixed cost in the economy are below 0.5%.
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independent of her being at strike). Both the worker and the firm take future decisions as given, so
we heavily rely on a Markov-perfect game-theoretic structure. Her utility difference when striking is
given by:
Vt,e,g˜ − V˜t,e,g˜ = λ1,twt,g˜ht,e,g˜(1− τ t,l)− ϕh
̺
t,e,g˜
− λ1,tstriket,g˜ (32)
while the threat point of the firm is given by
Π˜t,g˜ = pt,wAt,e,g˜ht,e,g˜ − wt,g˜ht,e,g˜ (33)
We therefore obtain, using again a Nash-bargaining procedure, the static wage condition:
wt,g˜ = µg˜pt,wAt,e,g˜ + (1− µg˜)[
striket,g˜
ht,e,g˜(1− τ l)
+
ϕh̺−1
g˜
λ1,t(1− τ l)
] (34)
= µg˜pt,wAt,e,g˜ + (1− µg˜)[
striket,g˜
ht,e,g˜(1− τ l)
+
pt,wAt,e,g˜
̺
] (35)
and the standard first order conditions for the choice of hours worked (independent of the assumed
threat point) in all three sectors is given by:
pwAt,e,g˜(1− τ l)λ1,t = ϕ̺h
̺−1
t,e,g˜
due to the joint efficiency of the bargaining process for workers on the job, and the standard hours
choice for inactive workers.
Note that average wages per hour will not depend on changes in taxes directly, if we assume that the
strike value is a fraction of average net wage wh.
striket,g˜ = strikeg˜wt,g˜ht,e,g˜(1− τ l) (36)
This assumption shields the wage from being affected by tax rate changes or changes in unemployment
benefits. Given that s is arbitrary and being never played, it is unobserved.15
This wage setting mechanism is ideally suited for our purposes in terms of long run taxation effects,
given that it shields the wage from any non-proportional effects of labor tax-rates, as it is assumed in
Arsenau and Chugh (2006) and as would be the case if we relied on the full Nash-bargaining solution
with unemployment as the outside option16. We view this equation as the long run steady state
15The literature has not converged on a particular wage setting mechanism. Many different forms have been employed.
It is fairly easy to provide, for each of this mechanisms, an underlying bargaining game that can ”rationalize” or
”microfound” the particular equation in use. The empirical content of such games appear to be an open question.
16We experimented with this wage rule quite a bit. However, to resolve the Shimer puzzle we had to rely on the small
surplus parameterization as in Jung (2005) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006). The model is much harder to calibrate
and has some undesirable properties.
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relation, that generates a constant profit markup unaffected by fiscal policy given that labor tax rates
cancel out as can be seen from the above equations.
However, to resolve the Shimer puzzle in a dynamic version of the model, we either need to assume
that wages are sticky as we do here or profits are additionally strongly procyclical due to an additional
technology effect, as is done in Costain and Reiter (2005a). As shown in Jung (2005) the above wage
setting rule could not, for any parameterization of the model, generate an unemployment volatility in
line with the data. A standard way to model wage stickeness, see Shimer (2005) or Hall and Milgrom
(2007), would be to assume a constant outside option:
striket,g˜ = strikeg˜wg˜ht,e,g˜(1− τ l) (37)
However, this assumption would lead to a positive first order effect of taxes on unemployment. Given
the arbitrariness of the wage setting assumption in these class of models we rule these effects out by
assumption. We resolve the dilemma between business cycle fluctuations and long run influence of
taxes by assuming the following form, similar to the one proposed in Blanchard and Gali (2008):
striket,g˜ = strikeg˜
wt,g˜ht,e,g˜(1− τ l)
Axt
(38)
Given that the technology level A is normalized to one in steady state, this assumption does not
influence long run optimal taxation results as shown in Jung (2008). By choosing x appropriately, we
can mimic the behavior of a sticky wage result as close as desired.17
It is worth pointing out that our sticky wage mechanism does not depend on a small surplus of the
match, as in Jung (2005) or Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006), (even though, of course, the underlying
economic argument is identical given that the surplus with respect to the cost of delaying is, of
course, extremely small), nor does it imply problematic responses of unemployment to governmental
interventions because, by assumption, we have ruled out any first order effects on profits.
2.5.1 Truncation
As shown above the option value is given by:
E∗ε˜t,ee,g˜ = −[ψq,g˜(1− qt,g˜) ln(1− qt,g˜) + ψqt,g˜ ln(qt,g˜))]
17A potential drawback, which is also true for the countercyclical bargaining power model of Shimer (2005) and the
procyclical technology model of Costain and Reiter (2005a) is the fact, that the model does not generalize to a higher
dimensional shock structure easily without imposing even stronger assumption on the joint process. However, almost
all of our results can be generated by assuming a constant outside option given that the choice of x turns out to deliver
precisely that.
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where ψx parameterizes the variances of the different distributions. All other truncated expectation
follow the identical line of reasoning.
2.6 Discrete Choices
In this section we describe the discrete choices made by the agents/family. In all cases, the choices
are made after the worker’s binding wage and hour contracts for this period have been made. We
assume in each case, that the bargained contract from the beginning of the period is binding and
can not be renegotiated. Given that we work for tractability with i.i.d. shocks the definition of
firings in this context are problematic, because in our framework it would be beneficial not to fire
the worker but to lay her off and wait one period.18 Also, if renegotiation is allowed, the firm might
want to compensate the worker for a bad shock to save new vacancy posting cost. Our discrete choice
assumption essentially means that when making their decisions workers and firms do not look at their
joint surplus, but just at their own utility differences. Even though the shocks are i.i.d. by assumption
they are denoted in terms of the total value of a state. That is we view them as a summary statistic
over the beliefs of the worker of how much pleasure a particular work environment will deliver to him.
To obtain the discrete choice probabilities we let the family/worker choose the cut-off level which is
equivalent to choosing the transition probabilities directly. Note that we have assumed that, say, the
firm has a right to manage and does the firing decision not taking into account the harm it inflicts
upon the worker. Vice versa, the worker does not take into account, when quitting, that the firm
takes a loss. So the decisions are not jointly efficient. Technically the case can be easily handled by
including the decisions in the bargaining choices and let workers and firms choose them jointly. Given
that the idiosyncratic shocks are hard to verify we felt that it is much more sensible to assume that
workers and firms make these decisions separately.19
Using the first order conditions and the definitions of the utility flows above we get the following
quitting decision:
qt,g˜ =
πe,e
1 + e
(
(−κΠ EΠt+1,g˜λ1,t+1+ϕg˜sq,g˜
̺
−Eβfg˜∆t,eu,g˜−Eβ(1−ft,g˜)qt,eo,g˜∆t,eo,g˜+(1−ft,g˜)E
∗ε˜t,eo,g˜−(1−ft,g˜)ϕf seo,g˜
̺qt,eo,g˜
ψq,g˜
)
(39)
18This fact also holds true for the standard endogenous destruction model of den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000),
where firings are also essentially lay-offs. This property is owned to the i.i.d. assumption, but we do not view this
property as particulary problematic.
19The resulting equations, say for firings, would include the flow values of the worker as well and would essentially be
a function of the total match surplus. Given that firms profit and total match surplus move in the same direction the
time series properties will likely not change much.
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where πe,e denotes the (exogenous) probability of receiving an outside offer
20.
The firing decision follows a similar line of reasoning.
ft,g˜ =
1
1 + e
Edt+1(1−qeo)Πt+1,m+κF,g˜
ψf,g˜
(40)
Here firms trade off the cost of keeping the worker while having to retrain him and pay a fixed cost
or simply firing him and pay some firing cost.
The decision to quit out of labor force is given by the utility difference between the two options
adjusted for the quitting cost, given that it is the last decision made in this stage.
qt,eo,g˜ =
1
1 + e
Eβ∆t+1,eo,g˜+ϕseo,g˜
̺
ψqeo,g˜
(41)
Similarly, the decision to quit into inactivity when currently searching for a job is given by:
qt,uo,g˜ =
1
1 + e
βE∆t+1,eo,g˜−Eβ(1−πt,ue,g˜)∆t+1,eu,g˜
ψquo,g˜
(42)
She weights the expected gains from searching against the value of being out of the labor force.
Finally, the decision to enter into the unemployment pool is given by:
πt,ou,g˜ =
1
1 + e
βE∆t+1,eu,g˜−βE∆t+1,eo,g˜+ϕg˜s
̺
o,g˜
ψπou,g˜
(43)
where the worker again trades-off the gain in searching and potentially receiving a job with the
setup cost of doing so. Each of these shocks is parameterized by its own parameter ψ governing the
idiosyncratic shock distribution.
2.7 Matching markets
There are separate matching markets for males and females. That is firms can observe sex and can
create different markets for both types. Given that males and females generate, potentially, a different
surplus once the match is formed this assumption avoids to model the decision of firms when faced
with a male and a female application, which might affect the shape of the matching function. It
also allows for different employment probabilities across sex, while a common matching market might
20We experienced with matching markets for employed and standard vacancy postings and matching decisions that
endogenize this probability. Given that the cyclical properties are very similar we decided to use the most simple
framework.
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not. On the other hand discrimination legislation might suggest a common matching market. We
feel that the hiring process can likely be influenced in a discriminatory way, so our treatment might
not conflict with this view. In any case, this assumption is not crucial for our results, given that a
common matching market does work rather similar.
To close the matching market we use the standard matching functions separated by sex:
Mt,g˜ = κg˜(ut,g˜(1− qt,uo,g˜))
ςv1−ςt,m (44)
Mt,g˜
vt,g˜
= θt,g˜ = κg˜
1
xς
t,g˜
(45)
Mt,
ut,g˜(1− qt,uo,g˜)
= πt,ue,g˜ = κg˜x
1−ς
t,g˜
(46)
xt,g˜ =
vt,g˜
ut,g˜(1− qt,uo,g˜)
(47)
We allow κ, the normalizing matching function coefficient, to be different for males and females.
Finally the free entry condition for males and females reads as:
(κg˜)
θt,g˜
= Edt+1Πt+1,g˜ (48)
2.8 Government and Exogenous
Finally we assume a balanced budget rule for the government, such that
Gt + Trt = mmwt,mht,met,mτ t,l +mmbt,m ∗ ut,m + (rt, − δ)τ t,cKt,
+mfwt,fht,fet,f τ t,l +mfbt,f ∗ ut,f (49)
The net replacement rates for males and females is given by
bt,g˜ = b˜g˜wg˜,thg˜,e˜,t(1− τ t,l) (50)
where b˜g˜ ∈ [0, 1) and is assumed to be proportional to net wages, such that it does not induce by
itself a reason for a positive capital taxation.
Before turning to results on optimal taxation we need to specify the behavior of the actual US govern-
ment. For the exogenous shock processes we assume that at, Gt, τ t,l and τ t,c follow exogenous AR(1)
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processes21, which we directly estimate from the data.
Gt = ge
gt (51)
gt+1 = ρggt + ǫg,t+1, ǫg ∼ N(0, σ
2
g) (52)
τ t,l = τ t,le
τ˜ t (53)
τ˜ t+1,l = ρτ τ˜ t,l + ǫτ ,t+1, ǫτ ∼ N(0, σ
2
τ ) (54)
τ t,c = τ t,ce
τ˜ t,c (55)
τ˜ t+1,c = ρτ τ˜ t,c + ǫτc,t+1, ǫτc ∼ N(0, σ
2
τc
) (56)
at+1 = ρat + ǫt , ǫt ∼ N(0, σ
2
a) (57)
We let the direct transfers Trt pick up the residual in the balanced budget rule. When discussing
optimal policy, transfers are set to zero.
For completeness we state the aggregate resource constrained of this economy for all periods (defining
aggregate consumption C1,t ≡ (mm +mf )c1,t):
C1,t + pwC2,t + It +Gt = Y1,t + pwY2,t −mmκmut,mxt,m −mfκfut,fxt,f −mmet,mκF,g˜ft,m(1− qt,m)
−mfet,fκF,g˜ft,f (1− qt,f ) +mmet,m(1− qt,m)E
∗ε˜t,Π,m +mfet,f (1− qt,f )E
∗ε˜t,Π,f
(58)
2.9 Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem of the above economy is defined as a planners problem that maximize fami-
lies utility over all endogenous taking the above described decentralized equilibrium constrains into
account. We follow the setup of Benigno and Woodford (2006a) closely.
That is we define governmental problem as choosing the evolution of the state vector zt according to:
W = max
{zt}
E0
∞∑
t=t0
Eβt−t0U(zt−1, zt, St)
s.t. : Etf(zt−1, zt, zt+1, St, St+1) = 0 (59)
Etf(zt0−1, zt0, zt1, St, St+1) = ft0 (60)
Here f collects the system of equation that characterize the above described decentralized economy,
z collects the vector of all endogenous variables of the model and S collects the exogenous shock
processes. We further assume that the initial pre-commitment rule ft0 is self-consistent in the sense
21Obviously, Gt, τ t,l and τ t,c do not need to be independent, so we can allow for correlation across the shocks.
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defined in Benigno and Woodford (2006a) such that the resulting government problem becomes recur-
sive.22 Given the assumption of a balanced budget rule, implying the abstraction from government
debt, our steady state equilibrium is unique also for other, more standard, restrictions on the initial
choice set of the government. It also does not drive our finding that capital taxes in this economy are,
typically, positive as long as the instrument set of the government is restricted to capital and labor
tax rates due to the assumed friction that the government cannot tax home-production. We derive
the Lagrange constraints of the government problem using symbolical derivatives and then solve for
the steady state numerically.23 To obtain time-series properties of the model we perturb the steady
state using a first order approximation to the lagrangian problem evaluated at the optimal steady
state which was shown to be equivalent to a second order approximation to welfare in Benigno and
Woodford (2006a). When looking at simple tax rules and applying the Kalman filter we use a first
order approximation relying, as before, on the code provided by Gomme and Klein (2006). A second
order approximation has been used to see how important non-linearities might be.24
3 Results
This section provides a quantitative evaluation of the properties of the model. We start out by
describing how we choose parameters and obtain the processes for the exogenous driving forces of
the model. Taking these processes as inputs we use the model to predict all labor market series and
compare them to the actual data. Given the fit of the model we then turn to a discussion of optimal
taxation results over the cycle.
22The concept of a precommitment rule is, mathematically, not entirely convincing as specified in Benigno and Wood-
ford (2006a). Given our balanced budget assumption we have ruled out governmental debt rules that typically create
non-uniqueness in the steady states of the Ramsey problem. In our case, therefore, the resulting time-inconsistency in
period zero will not affect our long run steady state behavior. Essentially we assume that the world starts, initially, very
close or in the steady state.
23The system has, in our coding around 68 variables (this is not the minimum, because we included some identities in
our code) and the Ramsey problem has, due to the fact that many lagged variables become part of the states, around
147 equations. We therefore do not give the entire system here.
24Given that the system is already quite big we rely on perturbation techniques when bringing the model to the data.
Labor market models do have non-linearities that can only be seen when using global methods. However, given that we
are mainly concerned with correlations and standard deviations over the cycle and our steady state discussion does not
require perturbations, we chose to proceed with perturbation methods.
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3.1 Calibration and Estimation
The appendix lists the parameters of the model together with the chosen targets. Most parameters
can be set in a standard fashion, so our discussion will focus on the complications that arise due to
the new features of the model.
Exogenous processes: The period of the model is one month which we aggregate to quarterly
frequency when discussing cyclical properties. We report results for the period 1970:1 to 2004:4.25 To
obtain sequences for the four exogenous series, we estimate the model with a Kalman filter using GDP,
labor tax rates and government expenditure to obtain estimates of the underlying shock variances of
the TFP shock, government expenditure and tax rates shocks respectively.26 The standard approach
to obtain an exogenous TFP shock, see Gomme and Rupert (2007) can not be used in our model, given
that we have a two good structure for measured output and the labor share is not equal to the wage
share. We want our model to be consistent with aggregate output and evaluate all other series relative
to this. Most labor market series, in particular labor force participation show strong long run trends
that must have affected output as well. We therefore choose a low frequency HP filter (λ = 100000) to
de-trend all series.27 Given the estimates of the Kalman filter for the exogenous states, we can predict
all endogenous using the model, taking the entire time-path prediction as our measure of fit.28
Calibration of Parameters - Basics: Our parameters are detailed in table (2)29. With respect
25The CPS labor market series separated by sex obtained from Shimer (2007) start in 1976 only. We use his merged
series for the years before to obtain a longer time-series. The mean rates are calibrated to the years 1976:1 to 2004:12,
see the appendix for the details.
26We initialize our Kalman filter in 1948:1 to obtain some estimates of the initial state.
27It is well known that this filtering procedure causes problems in obtaining ”true” innovations given that the HP-
filter will uses forward looking variables. However, if we use a linear trend in the Kalman estimation the results on the
frequency we consider are almost unchanged. In predicting all variables, on business cycle frequency, if (λ = 1600) or
using a BP-filter of Christiano-Fitzgerald for 2 to 8 years, the model would predict even better, so the low order HP-filter
makes it harder given the strong trends in the data for certain labor market series. Our model is not designed to explain
this trends within a business cycle estimation procedure.
28The fact that we basically employ a RBC interpretation using (essentially) one technology shock does not imply
that we believe other shocks to be unimportant. However the estimation results in Jung and Kuester (2007) based
on a simplified labor market model with monetary and wage frictions suggest, that the basic mechanism of strongly
pro-cyclical profits driven by a wage friction as the driving force for labor market volatility does survive the extension
to a more elaborate model featuring a more realistic set of shocks. In addition a parsimonious shock structure simplifies
the analysis on where and how the basic mechanism works and where it can be improved.
29Box 1 standard aggregate macroeconomic targets we wish our model to match, box 2 lists preference related param-
eters, box 3 list parameters related to the government, box 4 describes the technology parameters detailed in table(1),
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to standard labor market parameters, we set the elasticity of the matching function to .5 as in Hall
(2005), set the vacancy posting cost to 11% of the average monthly productivity of the match and the
hiring probability to 70%, as argued for in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006). The bargaining power
and the strike value are not jointly identifiable in our framework, so we set the bargaining power
arbitrary and innocently to 50% and choose the strike value such that the unemployment rate is 5.4%
for males and 6% for females as in the data. We target the right amount of unemployment volatility
by setting x, the sticky-wage parameter in our wage setting equation to match the volatility of the
unemployment to population rate, side-stepping the debate surrounding Shimer’s work. Note that our
choice of x is almost equivalent to a fixed outside option in a standard model, given that procyclical
wage income is counteracted by procyclical technology, making the strike-value acyclical. Our results
still hinge on a small surplus calibration. In our calibration vacancy posting cost and thereby profits
from a match from the firms perspective are small, implying that the resulting wedge is small and
wages are close to the competitive equilibrium outcome.30 Note, however, that the surplus for the
family (and thereby the total match surplus) is substantial in our calibration. The family would pay
3.1 times the average monthly net wage rate (or, equivalently one quarterly wage), to shift a male
worker directly from inactivity to work, and 1 month net wage for a female.31
Calibration of Parameters - New Features: We now turn to a discussion of the new parameters
in our model: We harmonize as many preference parameters across males and females as possible. The
first set of new parameters are related to the utility cost parameter sg˜
̺ and the variances ψg˜ of the
discrete choice distributions. We target these parameters by the mean transition rates separated by
sex and the variances of the choice probabilities obtained from our estimation procedure.32 We also
try to harmonize as much as possible the utility parameters governing the average utility cost across
box 5 lists standard labor market parameters and in box 6 parameters related to the discrete choices are discussed.
30Small surplus calibrations have been criticized forcefully, on a priori grounds. This might be correct but it implies
also that labor markets were, on average, far away from the competitive outcome. Scholars arguing in favor of substantial
profits must acknowledge that the world is substantially away from the neoclassical competitive benchmark.
31Note that our model can sustain a substantial surplus relative to the calibration of say Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2006) because our bargaining threat point is an abstract strike value that reflects labor market inefficiencies without
relating them to the real surplus. This trick, used in Hall and Milgrom (2007), of course implies that the surplus relative
to the threat point is still minuscule.
32Given that our parameter setting is subject to the constraint that the value of employment must be bigger than the
value of unemployment and the value of inactivity, the range of possible parameters is limit given all other targets. We
were unable to generate enough volatility in the transition rate from inactivity to unemployment and from unemployment
to inactivity. We chose the parameter governing search-cost sou to be zero, the boundary value. We varied the distribution
parameter of ψπou,m within the range of permissible values such that the value of employment is bigger than the value of
inactivity and picked the local maximum. However, the parameter is hard to identify and does not influence the cyclical
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sex and let the differences between sex be captured by the underlying distributions of the shock. As
discussed in the intuition section the variances are informative about the key elasticities that will drive
the reaction of the model to changes in the tax rate. The second moments of these time-series appear
therefore to be a natural choice to identify these elasticities.
Time-Aggregation: An immediate problem of targeting the mean rates is the fact that our model
does not have a direct transition from inactivity to employment, which is quantitatively non-negligible.
By definition these flows do not exist33 and are an immediate consequence of the time-aggregation bias
highlighted in Shimer (2007). However, in our view the main problem is not so much the aggregation
from a continous time framework to a discrete time framework, but the treatment of the flows from
employment to inactivity and vice versa. As shown in Nagypal (2005) around 40% of the transitions
from employment to inactivity are followed by a flow to employment with one intervening month.
Naturally what might happen is that workers have searched on the job, obtained a new job but due
to some time frictions the starting date is postponed by a month. Potentially the worker has to move,
or the worker simply takes a vacation. In fact we view part of these flows as quits on the job. We
deal with this problem by looking at the net flows from employment to inactivity. According to the
data of Fallick and Fleischman (2004) the flows from employment to inactivity are roughly 2 times as
large as the reversed flows. So we treat half of the flows from employment to inactivity as real quits,
and the other flows as part of the job-to job transitions. Table (3) lists our chosen targets. The stars
indicates that these variables are not freely chosen but need to adjust to fulfill the requirements of a
probability transition matrix. Note that our job-finding probability, while at odds with the unadjusted
monthly rates, is close to the average job-finding probability reported in Shimer (2005), who argues
that this rate was on average 45% over the last 60 years. This is a consequence of our treatment of
the net-flows from inactivity to employment.
Technology across state and sex: The second set of non-standard parameters are related to
the productive capability across sex on the job relative to the home-market. This margin is, as
discussed shortly when defining the elasticity, of crucial importance in identifying the reaction of
the participation decision of in particular female workers. In our benchmark scenario we chose the
productivity differences between males and females working in the market. We use the time-use
survey data of Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and compare the total amount of time spend working of an
employed worker relative to a non-employed worker using the definitions of work/leisure as highlighted
properties much.
33By definition a worker who obtains a job must have been matched to an employer, and must have exerted a time-
search cost, at least by answering the phone or appearing to an interview. So, in any case, there must have been a time
where he was actively searching, which implies that he must have been unemployed in between.
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in Aguiar and Hurst (2007). We find, that on average, a female supplies .77 as much time as their
male counterpart to market work. However, employed females do not enjoy more leisure, but use the
time-difference mainly working at home. More crucially for our purpose is the relative amount of time
supplied when out of the labor force compared to the employment state. While the classification,
what accounts as leisure, and what accounts as work, is somewhat arbitrary, see the critic by Ramey
(2007), this effect is reduced by looking at the quotient, given that a miss-specification shows up both
in the numerator and the denominator. In our benchmark calibration inactive males spent roughly
50% less time in undertaking productive activities (or enjoy 50% more leisure
ho,m
hm
= 1/2), while
females enjoy roughly 1/3 more leisure (
ho,f
hf
= 2/3)). Given that employed females work, on the job
and at home, jointly as much as males when employed, this implies that inactive females do devote
a substantial amount of time to activities that should be economically valued by society. In terms
of efficiency units (Ag˜,e˜) this implies that females are roughly 40% as productive at home than their
employed counterparts, while males are only 26% as efficient at home as on the job.34
Preferences: The third set of parameters is related to the utility specification. As discussed in the
intuition section, our basic mechanism supposes that, say a female, when making her entry decision
into the labor market, evaluates her time spend in the home market at the opportunity cost of time,
which is the market wage. We therefore work with a log utility specification of overall consumption to
be consistent with balanced growth, and choose, as a benchmark, the case of perfect substitutability
between the home produced good and the market service good. We set the elasticity between the final
good and the service good (γ1) to .4 in line with the findings of McGratten, Rogerson, and Wright
(1997) and set the share γ to .5, which implies that 10% of the working population works in sectors
with a high substitution elasticity to home-produced goods. Our results are not sensitive to the choice
of these last two parameters. Perfect substitutability might appear as a strong assumption given the
findings. Note however, that McGratten, Rogerson, and Wright (1997) look at a two good economy,
while our argument relies strongly on the ability of say a female to buy child care in the market.35
Government: Finally, with respect to parameters influencing governmental policy, we set the labor
tax rate to 24% as observed in the data, choose a government expenditure to output rate of 20% and
set the capital tax residually (28.7%)36 In our model unemployment benefits payed to the unemployed
34The fact that females work less hours in the market than males implies in our model that females are less efficient.
We normalize Am = 1 and the hour differential (and also the wage differential) between males and females implies
that Af = .68. What matters for our purposes is not so much the absolute number, but the relative distance to home-
production. Here Ao,m = Au,m = .26 and Ao,f = Au,f = .28.
35As we discuss in Jung(2008) the parameter is important for determining long run optimality results.
36The data would suggest a rate of around 30% for the before depreciation capital tax, and around 50% for the after
depreciation capital tax, see Gomme and Rupert (2007).
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would work as a subsidy to search, given that our model does not differentiate properly between
unemployed coming from employment state and unemployed coming from inactivity.37 We therefore
treat unemployment benefits as transfers to the family that do not influence the decision of starting
to search when inactive.38
We estimate the autocorrelation and variances of our AR(1)- processes directly from the data and let
the cyclical residual be picked up by lump-sum transfers to fulfill the balanced budget.
3.1.1 Evaluation of the Model
This section summarizes the properties of the model with respect to key labor market variables.
Before going into the details of the estimation results, it is helpful to recall what ultimately drives
our results and which feature of the model is responsible for the successes and failures highlighted
below. First, any labor market model of the Mortensen-Pissarides type has to embed a mechanisms
that resolves the Shimer puzzle. While there are conflicting views on this issue, the ultimate driving
force of any mechanism proposed that we are aware of, and that entertains the free entry condition
for vacancies, is an argument why profits in a boom increase strongly over-proportional relative to
wages. For example, Costain and Reiter (2005a) argue that newly hired workers receive an additional
productivity gain correlated, fairly ad hoc, with the business cycle that introduces additional profits
into the model. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006), Jung (2005) and Hall and Milgrom (2007) argue,
in one way or the other, that the surplus of the match relative to a particular outside option is
small, such that equilibrium profits boost, in percentage terms, over-proportional relative to wages.
The same argument underlies the ideas in Shimer (2007) who makes the bargaining power (negatively)
correlated with the business cycles. Other ideas, like Blanchard and Gali (2008) and Jung and Kuester
(2007), make the outside option negatively correlated with the shocks. Given that the literature has
not converged to a particular, convincing, resolution, potentially due to the fact, that the amount
of wage setting mechanisms proposed are huge, and wage payments are badly pinned down even
in the neoclassical model, we rely on a sticky wage mechanism that essentially induces a counter-
cyclical outside option. More important for our purpose is the fact that labor tax rate changes or
unemployment benefit changes do not have any first order effects on the wage setting equation. This
avoids the critic raised by Costain and Reiter (2005a) who question the equilibrium response of the
37To capture this effect the model would have to introduce an additional state and additional flows making the model
even more complex. Given that the role of unemployment benefits is not the main focus of the paper we chose to assume
it away.
38Obviously, the model can easily be recalibrated and unemployment benefits can be included. None of our basic
results would change.
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small surplus calibration of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and shields the unemployment rates from
first order effects of tax rate changes (or unemployment benefit changes)39, which we feed into the
model exogenously. Only general equilibrium effects remain, which are small in nature. We therefore
evaluate the success of the model relative to a mechanisms that induces the right volatility into the
job-finding probability. Second, as is well known since the work of den Haan, Ramey, and Watson
(2000), endogenous firings, and by extension, all endogenous choice probabilities, are driven by the
mass of workers around the cut-off level. If shocks are proportional to productivity as in den Haan,
Ramey, and Watson (2000) , the idiosyncratic variance of the, typically log-normal shocks, drives the
volatility of the rates almost one for one. In our case, the means and variance of the additive shocks
are driven by the underlying extreme value distribution that in turn determines the mass of workers
that are affected by a change in the endogenous together with the fixed cost that jointly determine
the means and variances. Again, no particular success can be claimed along these dimensions. In
this paper we precisely use this connection to pin down the underlying heterogeneity in preferences
or life-circumstances, the model generously has abstracted from, as part of our calibration strategy.
The success and failure of the model lies therefore in the correlation across all variables which is
neither targeted nor is there an immediately obvious relation that drives our results. Note that all
of our probabilities, due to the discrete choice structure, are ultimately functions of the share of the
match surplus that goes to workers and firms, and therefore induces strong equilibrium restrictions
on the correlations across variables. To highlight how these correlations evolve, we report the entire
time-path prediction for all variables. This gives additional valuable information on the failure and
success of the basic mechanisms, because it captures, essentially, all lead and lag cross-correlations
across variables.
Table (4) gives the basic moments of the model and Figure(9) to Figure(4) visualize the performance
of the model for selected series:40
39In fact, unemployment rates are, to a first order, unaffected to changes in unemployment benefits, such that the
semi-elasticity highlighted in Costain and Reiter (2005a) would be zero. Given that benefits would induce a change in
search activities for workers out of the labor force it would have, as a second order effect due to general equilibrium,
have an effect on unemployment rates by making search, or entry into the search pool, more attractive. This effect, of
course, is due to the fact that our model does not differentiate the state of unemployment as coming from employment,
or coming from out of the labor force. A four state model would be needed that seperates these effects. However, the
model would have to keep track of the entire distribution of labor market states, so we choose to ignore this complication.
40All data are in logs, given that our mean rates do not always correspond to the data-means and might otherwise
have a feedback effect into the standard deviation.
28
Figure 2: Employment
1980 2000
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
Employment − Pop Male
1980 2000
−0.05
−0.04
−0.03
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Employment − Pop Female
1980 2000
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Urate
The figure shows the prediction of the model relative to the data for the employment to population
rate of males and females as well as the unemployment rate. The blue solid lines are the data, while
the red dashed lines are the predicted series. All data and predictions are in logs and are HP-filtered
with λ = 100000.
Employment States:
The first fact to highlight is that the model predicts the unemployment rate very well, as figure (2)
makes clear. The actual series correlates with .92 to the predicted series. Given that unemployment
and output are highly correlated and we targeted the relative standard deviation of unemployment
to output in the calibration, this result is not entirely surprising, though still a reconfirming feature
of the model. It shows that the Mortensen-Pissarides model with a wage-frictions is an excellent
model for discussing cyclical properties of labor market variables, in contrast to recent claims in the
literature.41 The model overpredicts the volatility in the employment-population rate for both males
41This does not mean that the, ad hoc, wage friction is a satisfying modeling device, but it does mean, that alternative
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and females and overpredicts the correlation for females while it matches almost perfectly the reaction
for males. This is mainly due to an overshooting in the oil-price crises in the eighties and at the end
of the sample, which might be driven by the strong labor tax decline, that might be miss-measured.
Nipa and BLS-aggregates:
The model predicts, see figure (3), investment almost perfectly, while it under-estimates the volatility
in consumption,42 but captures the correlation correctly. The model fails to match the wage per
hour series obtained from the BLS for non-farm business almost completely, at least during the late
eighties up to now, even though the correlation-coefficient comes close. The model correlates very well
with the total hour measure from the BLS, but underpredicts the volatility. This is mainly due to
an underprediction of the average hours worked per person, given that total employment is matched
rather accurately.
Two remarks about this failure are in order: first, note that Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) use the
role of wages over the cycle as a target to explain the success of the Mortensen-Pissarides framework
in explaining unemployment volatility. We caution to judge the ability of the Mortensen-Pissarides
model to generate unemployment volatility by a matched wage-elasticities alone, either by claiming
a success or by claiming a failure, given the picture provided above. As the prediction makes clear
the correlation-coefficient (and likely the elasticity) is not a sufficient statistic for capturing the wage
dynamics.
However, second, it is unlikely that any standard RBC model will be able to explain the behavior
of the above wage series given that between 1994 and 2000, say, common believe, our TFP-shock
and our hours worked measure suggest a substantial boom of the US economy, while wages suggest a
severe depression. If these data are actually correct, our model is unable to explain them and the wage
friction we highlight is problematic.43 However, the wage and hour concepts used by the BLS is clearly
explanations have to be at least as good along this margin and better in some other dimension. This has yet to be shown.
42Note that in principle, given that we use government expenditure and output in our estimation procedure and match
investment by implication, consumption should me matched perfectly as well, being the residual. Of course, given that
we filter all series seperately the HP-filter distorts the identity, so does foreign trade.
43Note, however, that the model makes strong assumption how wages are split, but this must not correspond to wages
payed . The timing of wage payments is undefined given that both the family and the firm would be willing to shift the
discounted flows back and force in time. Some small cost involved in changing payed wages over the quarter could give
raise to very different observed wage-payments. However, obviously, this argument is a cheap way out of the problem,
making the theory not falsifiable.
30
Figure 3: Nipa and BLS-Aggregates
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The figure shows the prediction of the model relative to the data for total hours worked, investment
and wages per hour. Hours and wage per Hours are taken from the BLS, while investment is NIPA
investment plus consumer durables. The blue solid lines are the data, while the red dashed lines are
the predicted series. All data and predictions are in logs and are HP-filtered with λ = 100000.
not consistent with other wage and hour series used in the literature, so some caution is appropriate.
This point is emphasized in ? who argues that Nipa compensation is seriously miss-measured.
Labor Market Probabilities:
As mentioned in the calibration section, we were unable to generate enough volatility for the unem-
ployment to inactivity flows and vice versa. 44 However, given that we understate both rates, part
of the failure might actually cancel out, given the noisy estimates of these flows. As the picture, see
figure (4), and the table(4), make clear the model captures the correlation to output as well as the
entire cyclical movements very well.
44This is due to the fact that we reached the lower bound of the search cost, setting them to zero, so we did not
have the degree of freedom to jointly match the mean rates and the volatility. This is in part due to our ignorance with
respect to flows from inactivity to employment, that we channel through transitions from inactivity to unemployment.
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Figure 4: Probabilities
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The figure shows the prediction of the model relative to the data for the average transition flows. The
data are taken from Shimer (2007). The blue solid lines are the data, while the red dashed lines are
the predicted series. All data and predictions are in logs and are HP-filtered with λ = 100000.
In fact, it is interesting to note that transition rates from unemployment to inactivity are positively
correlated with the business cycle , while the transition rates from inactivity to unemployment is
negatively correlated with the business cycle, in the data and the model. Intuitively one might have
expected that in a boom more, say, females would start searching, not less. Apparently the wealth
effect overturns this result, given that the family as a whole is richer in a boom and does not need
to force that many females with a potentially negative shock realization to enter the search pool.
Flows from inactivity to employment are procyclical in the data, which we capture in our model by
strongly procyclical quits. Quits to inactivity are countercyclical in the model and the data though
our model overpredicts the correlation. The model explains firings very convincingly, if we abstract
from high-frequency noise that surrounds the estimate. In our model, firing rates (or seperations from
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employment to unemployment) and the job-finding probability are driven by the same variable, Π, the
surplus of the match from the firms perspective, which corresponds to the prediction of the standard
model. Given the picture the standard insights offered from the Mortensen-Pissarides framework
appear to be correct. This also implies that the debate on the importance of the ”Ins” versus the
”Outs” appears less severe given that both rates are driven by the identical force.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the model generates the right beveridge-curve despite the
fact that firing rates are endogenous.45
To summarize, the model, driven by a parsimonious shock structure does capture the basic movements
and correlation signs of all probabilities correctly, and predicts the time-path of all labor market
transitions and states in our view to a reasonable extent. A richer shock structure as well as an
interaction with some standard macroeconomic frictions not considered in this model might enhance
the fit. The price to pay though is the loss of a parsimonious shock structure. Also, a much better
understanding of the behavior of hours worked and wages per hour is needed to claim a real success.
3.2 Optimal Fluctuations
So far we have treated tax policy as exogenous. In the companion paper, see Jung (2008), we show
that Ramsey-optimal labor and capital tax rates are not too far from observed US values. The friction
that drives our result is the assumed inability of the government to tax home-production. Labor tax
rates generate a distortion in particular for females to enter the main labor market. The resulting
wedge needs to be counteracted, in the absence of additional instruments, by positive capital taxes.
Our results are driven by differences in the implied intra-temporal elasticity of substitution which is,
in our model, not driven by the hours worked margin, but mainly driven by participation friction. To
see the quantitative impact of labor tax rates figure (7) plots the impulse response function to a unit
shock in labor tax rates.
We see that the government has, by setting labor tax rates over the cycle, a potentially strong in-
strument to influence employment. Our wage setting assumption though rules out a direct effect of
tax rate changes on the profit margin of firms, a typical mechanism highlighted in Costain and Re-
iter (2005b), who find strong dampening forces of labor taxes to the job-finding probability, thereby
stabilizing unemployment. In our model the government has an effect on the participation decision of
workers. By setting pro-cyclical labor tax rates the government can create an incentive in particular
45It is interesting to note that the argument of Shimer (2005), that fluctuating destruction rates would destroy the
Beveridge-curve is not valid in our model. Even if firings are double or triple as volatile as quits on the job, and, corre-
spondingly, destruction rates were counter-cyclical, we would still obtain a negative correlation between unemployment
rates and vacancies. What is crucial is the endogeneity of both rates, while Shimer makes them exogenously fluctuating.
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for females to enter the labor market in recessions and can thereby stabilize employment and output.
As the figure makes clear, an increase in labor tax rates encourage, at the margin, in particular fe-
males to exit the unemployment search pool and to move into inactivity. This effect translates into
a decline in employment rates and a corresponding increase in non-participation rates. The effect on
unemployment is non-monotonic. Initially more workers get discouraged and drop out of the search
pool into non-participation, which translates into an increase in matching success for the remaining
workers. However, this effect is quickly dominated by the general equilibrium effects of a decline in
hours worked on the job and a reduction in output, making it less attractive for workers to start
searching and increases the cost of existing matches.
The question remains whether the government should use this described impact on employment by
stabilizing output fluctuations over the cycle?
Ramsey-Optimal labor tax path:
To address this question we use the estimated exogenous TFP shock and the governmental expenditure
shock as given, and ask how the economy would have evolved if US taxes had followed a Ramsey
optimal rule. To this end we re-solve the model around the optimal labor and capital tax rates
implied by our model and perturb the Ramsey-optimal steady state following the approach outlined
in Benigno and Woodford (2006a) . As shown in Jung (2008) the optimal capital and labor tax rates
evaluated at the above discussed steady state values is given by 25.8% and 23.1% respectively. Given
that actual fiscal policy does not coincide with the optimal policy implied by our model, the steady
states across our two exercises do therefore change. However, as we show in Jung (2008), the implied
optimal labor tax rate in the steady state is not far away from the optimal tax rules, and the general
equilibrium changes in endogenous variables are very modest. A comparison of the cyclical properties
across the two steady states is therefore still meaningful.
We find that the logarithm of the optimal labor tax rate should have been half as volatile than the
measured actual tax rate. However, the cyclical properties are fairly similar. Figure (5) plots the
predicted tax series as well as the predicted employment sequences for males and females under an
optimal rule.
We see that the access volatility in employment rates is reduced under the optimal one compared to
the volatility we showed above under an exogenous policy rule, but the reduction is only modest.46
46The actual tax rate shows high volatility in the end of the sample, in line with the behavior of our wage per hour
measure (and also overall compensation measure from which labor taxes have been inferred) measure.Again, even though
we followed a standard procedure from macroeconomics, see Gomme and Rupert (2007), in constructing our labor tax
34
Figure 5: Optimal Labor Tax Rates
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The figure shows the optimal labor tax path implied by the model (dashed red line) vs. the actual
tax rate path (solid blue line), as well as predicted pathes for selected labor market states.
In fact part of our ”excess volatility” on employment rates might have been driven by ”labor tax rate
shocks” that might have been fully anticipated by the agents as part of a governmental rule or that
might have been simple measurement error due to the problematic construction of average tax rates
out of macroeconomic aggregates. In any case, our model suggests that the government should not
excessively use its influence on employment to smooth out cycles. The reasons for this result lies in
the fact that our model imposes considerable cost for workers to move across employment states. A
change in behavior induces cost, either moving cost or search cost, which we have, partly endogenized
in this paper. A social (Ramsey) - planner would and should take these cost into account.
Can we therefore conclude that the explicit modeling of the inactivity margin is unimportant for
cyclical policy?
What can go wrong?
To show how important endogenous transition rates might be figure (6) plots the behavior of the
model when we fix capital taxes at the steady state value and let labor tax rates only balance the
budget. This happens in some models who specify, say, a total income tax rule (typically jointly with
a debt stabilization rule).
In this case, labor taxes are counter-cyclical! Even though overall volatility of tax rates increases only
modestly compared to the actual and unemployment volatility is not strongly affected, we see a strong
impact on employment rates. This is due to a strong cyclical behavior of the probability to enter
measure it is clear that actual tax rates might have behaved rather differently given that NIPA compensation might be
seriously miss-measured. The time-series are, therefore, at best a crude approximation, but the best that was available
to us for the time period considered. In particular we suspect that the volatility is strongly overstated.
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Figure 6: Counter-cyclical Tax Rate
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The figure shows the labor tax path implied by the model (dashed red line) vs. the actual tax rate
path (solid blue line) under a hypothetical policy rule, as well as predicted pathes for selected labor
market states.
the market. The search flow is quickly absorbed into employment rates and employment volatility
strongly increases, so does output volatility. Counter-cyclical labor tax rate were a disaster.
This example makes clear that even though observed transition rates might not have contributed
much to the fluctuation in the employment to population ratio as claimed in Shimer (2007), this should,
in our view, not lead to the conclusion of not modeling these transitions carefully when conducting
policy experiments. A wrong policy can have very bad consequences along these margins.
4 Conclusion
The paper presents a model that endogenizes all labor market transition rates in a tractable fashion.
We show that the model is able to replicate key facts of the labor market dynamics when estimated
on a parsimonious shock structure. The government has, by influencing the entry margin, a strong
policy instrument to influence employment fluctuations. The fact that the government cannot tax
home-production easily leads naturally to an inter-temporal distortion of labor taxes that is absence
in the neoclassical world. This distortive effect mainly affects the participation decision of the worker.
However, in equilibrium, this influence comes at a considerable cost. To rationalize observed average
transition rates males and females must face significant entry cost that need to be accounted for in
general equilibrium. It is therefore not optimal for the government to smooth out transition rates
to strongly. Whether this prescription holds when we enrich the model along sticky prices and other
demand side frictions has yet to be demonstrated. Potentially interesting trade-offs between fiscal and
monetary policy might emerge.
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5 Appendix
The appendix summarizes our calibration procedure and shows the predictions of our model.
5.1 Calibration
We first describe the data used in the estimation procedure. Table (1) shows total hours worked
obtained from the American Time Use Survey, table (2) gives the parameter values chosen together
with the description of the targets and table (3) gives the average monthly probabilities we target.
5.1.1 Data
Aggregate data are nominal output, consumption (non-durable and services), investment (plus durable
consumption) and government expenditure taken from the NIPA and deflated by the GDP-deflator
and expressed in per capita terms. Average labor and capital taxes are obtained using the procedure
outlined in Gomme and Rupert (2007). Total Hours worked and wages per hour in non-farm business
are taken from the BLS as well as aggregate labor market states. Labor market probabilities are taken
from Shimer (2007). In the plots we use his aggregate measure and his time-aggregation correction
downloaded from his homepage. For the HP-filter employed this measure turns out to be very similar
with respect to its cyclical properties as the monthly unadjusted rates. The data from June 1967 and
December 1975 were tabulated by Joe Ritter and made available by Hoyt Bleakley. The monthly rates
separated by sex are taken from the CPS micro-data using the (adjusted) code and were constructed
by Robert Shimer.
5.1.2 American Time Use Survey
Table 1: Time-Use-Survey
Year Work-Male (Emp) Work-Female (Emp) Work-Male (Inactive) Work-Female (Inactive)
1975 51.55 53.47 22.7 39.04
1985 53.39 52.82 27.95 36.78
1993 53.63 52.97 28.64 35.15
2003 54.15 52.2 24.13 33.37
Notes: The data have been made publicly available by Aguiar and Hurst (2007) and we follow their definitions. We drop all people under the age of
21 and over 65 as well as retired workers from the sample. We then condition on age (not reported), sex and employment status. We do not use fixed
sample weights controlling for changes in demographics across surveys as in Aguiar and Hurst (2007) but report averages across our demographic cells,
given that changes in these cells are our primary focus. Our definition of work uses their definition: work = work core +home production
work core = regular-work+working-at-home+overtime+moonlighting
home production = meals + housework + home car maintenance + home other + garden - pet + obtaining - goods
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5.1.3 Calibration - Parameters
Table 2: Basic Calibration
Parameters Value Target
Box 1
β 0.997 Capital-output-ratio=4
α 0.400 Capital share=.4
δ 0.004 Investment to output ratio=.2
ρ 0.950 .95 (quarterly)
mm 1.000 Population normalization
mf 1.000 Population normalization
Box 2
σ 1.000 Balanced Growth
γ1 0.500 McGratten, Rogerson, and Wright (1997)
γ 0.400 10% in labor sector in the market
γ2 1.000 Perfect Substitutability
ϕm 11.651 hm = .3
ϕf 11.651 hm = .3
ϕo,m 11.651 Equal across sex
ϕo,f 11.651 Equal across sex
φ 2.500 Micro-estimates
Box 3
bm 0.000 Treated as Transfers
bf 0.000 Treated as Transfers
gss 0.781
g
y
= .2
τ l 0.240 τ l = .24
Box 4
Am 1.000 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Af 0.676 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Au,m 0.269 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Au,f 0.275 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Ao,m 0.269 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Ao,f 0.275 Aguiar and Hurst (2007) time use survey
Box 5
strikem 0.599 um
strikef 0.598 uf
κm 0.316 Vacancy posting Cost
κf 0.190 Vacancy posting Cost
ζm 0.500 Matching Elasticity
ζf 0.500 Matching Elasticity
µm 0.500 Set to Hosios (Bargaining Power)
µf 0.500 Set to Hosios (Bargaining Power)
κm 0.637 Normalized (Constant in Matching fct.)
κf 0.693 Normalized (Constant in Matching fct.)
Box 6
ψq,m 1.006 Average qm
ψq,f 1.046 Average qf
ψf,m 0.947 Average fm
ψf,f 0.852 Average ff
ψquo,m 3.676 Average quo,m
ψquo,f 0.925 Average quo,f
ψπou,m 12.45 * Std(πou,m
ψπou,m 7.960 * Std(πou,f
ψqeo,m 2.817 Average qeo,m
ψqeo,f 1.951 Average qeo,f
sou,m 1.645 Average om
sou,f 1.369 Average of
sq,m 4.000 Std(q)
sq,f 4.000 Harmonized
seo,m 6.670 Std(qeo)
seo,f 6.670 Harmonized
κfir,m 3.400 Std(f)
κfir,f 3.400 Harmonized
suo,m 0.000 *Std(quo)
suo,f 0.000 *Boundary
x 0.75 σ2u (Wage Stickeness)
Notes: This table gives the numerical parameters used and the attempted targets the particular parameter influences the most. The
stars indicate that we were unable to achieve this target. We set suo,m to the boundary value 0. Given all other targets the influence of
ψπou,m on the variance is small and we were unable to generate enough volatility there, given that again we hit the boundary that the
value of employment must be bigger than the value of inactivity on average. We varied the parameter in the allowable range and set it
to the value that gave the maximal variance, even though the impact of this parameter on the results is rather small.
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5.1.4 Average Probabilities
The following table gives the average probabilities of our model in our benchmark steady state.
Table 3: Mean-Probabilities
Variables Model CPS Monthly Shimer (2007) Fallick et al. (94)
Job to Job (Male) 0.025 0.025
Job to Job (Female) 0.025 0.025
Job to Job (Average) 0.025 0.025 - 0.025
Firing (Male) 0.017 0.017
Firing (Female) 0.013 0.013
Firing (Average) 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.013
Quit E to Inactiv (Male) 0.011 0.021
Quit E to Inactiv (Female) 0.019 0.039
Quit E to Inactiv (Average) 0.014 0.029 0.029 2.700
Job-Finding (Male)* 0.480 0.245
Job-Finding (Female)* 0.500 0.283
Job-Finding (Average)* 0.489 0.265 0.369 0.280
Quit U-Inactivity (Male) 0.170 0.171
Quit U-Inactivity (Female) 0.270 0.275
Quit U-Inactivity (Average) 0.215 0.219 0.311 0.230
Inactivity-U (Male)* 0.058 0.033
Inacitivity-U (Female)* 0.043 0.022
Inacitivity-U (Average)* 0.048 0.026 0.044 0.024
Inactivity-E (Male) - 0.055
Inacitivity-E (Female) - 0.042
Inacitivity-E (Average) - 0.046 0.044 0.048
E (Male) 0.710 0.711
U (Male)* 0.041 0.047
O (Male) 0.250 0.242
E (Female) 0.526 0.525
U (Female)* 0.034 0.036
O (Female) 0.440 0.440
Notes : The table documents our calibration targets for the average monthly transition probabilities. The stars
above indicate that these variables can not be chosen freely, but have to fulfill the requirements of a transition
matrix.
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5.2 Properties of the Model
Table 4: Basic Properties (HP=100000)
Log: Relative Std to Y Corr with Output Corr(Model,Data)
Model Data Model Data
Std Corr(Y,x) Corr(Y,x) Corr(x̂,x)
Model Data Model Data
Y 0.022 0.022 1.000 1.000 1.00
C 0.344 0.690 0.771 0.832 0.70
I 3.857 3.551 0.965 0.826 0.93
G 1.427 1.427 0.227 0.219 1.00
τ l 1.550 1.550 0.332 0.323 1.00
τc 2.208 2.208 0.424 0.455 1.00
Hours 0.791 1.218 0.915 0.835 0.70
Wage per Hour 0.259 0.724 0.375 0.208 0.10
Employed (Male) 0.854 0.683 0.904 0.905 0.93
Employed (Female) 0.841 0.665 0.866 0.724 0.72
Unemployed (Male) 7.887 8.043 -0.905 -0.902 0.92
Unemployed (Female) 5.271 5.532 -0.904 -0.868 0.86
Out of labor(Male) 1.328 0.567 -0.780 -0.575 0.68
Out of labor(Female) 0.714 0.435 -0.709 -0.405 0.24
Transition Probabili-
ties:
U-Rate 7.034 6.986 -0.914 -0.899 0.92
Vacancies 9.658 8.581 0.799 0.821 0.752
EU 3.435 3.671 -0.934 -0.754 0.749
EN 1.977 1.931 0.658 0.379 0.273
UE 7.829 6.016 0.934 0.822 0.730
UN 1.911 4.847 0.630 0.776 0.721
NU 0.282 3.094 -0.631 -0.577 0.471
NE - 2.566 - 0.610 -
Q 2.145 - 0.931 - -
Notes : The table documents the performance of the model. The standard deviation is expressed relative to
output except for output itself, which is given in raw terms. Here Y denotes output, C consumption, I investment
and G government expenditure. EU denotes the the flow probability from employment to unemployment, and
all other follow a corresponding notation. All data are HP-filtered with λ = 100000.
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5.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figure 7: Impulse Response Function - Labor Tax Rates
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The figure shows the Impulse Response function for selected variables of the model. Here m denotes
male, f denotes female, and u,o and e are the employment states. The other variables denote the
transition flows across labor market states.
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Function - Technology
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The figure shows the Impulse Response function for selected variables of the model. Here m denotes
male, f denotes female, and u,o and e are the employment states. The other variables denote the
transition flows across labor market states.
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5.4 Graphs
The graphs show the exogenous processes where government expenditure is taken from the NIPA, labor
and capital taxes are created using NIPA data following the methodology of Gomme and Rupert (2007)
and the technology process is estimated using a Kalman filter on output given the model.
Figure 9: Exogenous Shock Processes
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